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Abstract
This paper explores a real-world fundamental theme under a data sci-
ence perspective. It specifically discusses whether fraud or manipulation
can be observed in and from municipality income tax size distributions,
through their aggregation from citizen fiscal reports. The study case per-
tains to official data obtained from the Italian Ministry of Economics and
Finance over the period 2007-2011. All Italian (20) regions are consid-
ered. The considered data science approach concretizes in the adoption
of the Benford first digit law as quantitative tool. Marked disparities
are found, - for several regions, leading to unexpected ”conclusions”. The
most eye browsing regions are not the expected ones according to classical
imagination about Italy financial shadow matters.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the relevant theme of identifying the existence of anoma-
lies in tax incomes. We specifically focus on the case of Italian regions. The
problem is faced under a data science perspective, which is suitable for the scope
of the study. Indeed, data science represents nowadays a major area in the re-
search frontier for processing large sets of data (see e.g. Carbone et al., 2016
and references therein contained).
The relevance of the study lies in the evidence that assessing the errors
in financial statements is a major task of auditors, regulators, or analysts not
only in financial markets, but also in macroeconomic and public affairs, like on
governmental economic data. Reports of accurate financial statement data are
crucial, even essential, to the management of public budgets. Thus, it is manda-
tory to observe whether misestimations, mistakes, biases, or even manipulations
have occurred or are occurring (Puyou, 2014). On the other hand, academic
researchers must propose ways for detecting errors or anomalies. Many meth-
ods have been proposed and steps taken in creating and validating techniques
to assess different constructs of errors (Cooper et al. 2013). However, despite
substantial progress, in this safety area, available methods present deficiencies
that limit their usefulness, - sometimes due to unclear hypotheses underlying the
method. Most likely, this will continue for ever, since it is well known that the
imagination of crooks leads to further more sophisticated manipulation, while
reaction of ”policy makers” is impaired by legal processes. Yet, controls are
challenged by intelligent people, lacking classical ethics.
Without suggesting opprobrium on all Italian citizens because of supposed
to be tax evasion by a few, before debating individual cases, it is often admit-
ted that Italy is one of the top countries losing to tax evasion (after the USA and
Brazil) through a GDP ranking (http : //investorplace.com/investorpolitics/10− worst − countries− for − tax− evasion/#.V vkqf3AR54c),
or through the amount of tax loss as a result of shadow economy. Income manip-
ulation might thus be rightfully tested on such a (country) case, - as somewhat
in line with recently discussed pertinent topics, from points of view related to
ethics and organized crime, by e.g. Brosio et al. (2002), Alexeev et al. (2004),
Calderoni (2011), or Mir et al. (2014).
Of course, not only citizens falsify their financial data, but also firms and even
governments (Aggarwal and Lucey 2007; Michalski and Stoltz 2013; Luippold
et al. 2015). For example, questions have been raised about the data submitted
by Greece to the Eurostat to meet the strict deficit criteria set by the European
Union (EU), - see Rauch et al. (2011), or about the macroeconomic data of
China (Holz 2013). Managers can engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance
than shareholders would otherwise prefer (Armstrong et al. 2015). On the
other hand, firms have incentives to manipulate earnings in order to convince
investors, e.g. to report a rounded to a upper value number when they have
profits (i.e., USD 40 million) and to report a number such as USD 39.95 million,
when they have losses, - as discussed by Thomas (1989), having observed such
unusual patterns in reported earnings. This rounding approach points to a
”moderate manipulation” of the data. However, its relevance is considered not
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d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Freq. 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
Table 1: Frequency (”Freq.”) of the first digit (d) in a set of data; d values
ranging from 1 to 9, - according to BL1, Eq.(1).
to be negligible for investors.
At the ”lower level”, that of citizens, it is also known that seemingly small
rounding manipulations can influence financial statement users’ perception of
credit quality (Guan et al 2008). At another level, that where the citizen is
immersed in a crowd, and expects to be protected by some shadow due to a
bigger cheater, it is interesting to raise the question whether a collective effect
can be seen. This can be done through examining income tax contributions at
local levels. This accounting level is the core of our investigation and report.
A review of statistical methods of fraud detection has been provided by
Bolton and Hand (2001, 2002), while accountants’ perceptions regarding fraud
detection and prevention methods have been recently discussed Bierstaker et
al. (2006); see also Wadhwa and Pal (2012) for a quick summary or Lin et al.
(2015) for a specific discussion of a couple of techniques.
In this context, the data science approach proposed in the present paper is
based on the Benford law.
This Benford law, originally for the first digit (BL1) distribution of data
sets, follows a logarithmic law:
P (d) = log10(1 +
1
d
), d = 1, 2, . . . , 9, (1)
where P (d) is the probability that the first digit is equal to d in the data set;
log10 being the logarithm in base 10.
This ”law” stems from observations by Newcomb (1881) and later indepen-
dently by Benford (1938) that the distribution of the 1st digit is more concen-
trated on smaller values: the digit ”1” has the highest frequency, ”9” the lowest
frequency. In Table 1, the frequency of the first digit, as given by BL1, is recalled
for the reader convenience. Thereafter, mathematics can suggest empirical law
for the 2nd, 3rd, ... digit distribution. However, since the latter becomes quickly
rather uniform, it becomes hard (but it is done) to use such high level digits for
testing the validity of reported data. Thus, let us concentrate our aim below to
the first digit, i.e. on the validity (or not) of BL1 in a specific case, serving as
a paradigm for other big data investigations.
In general, Benford law has to be recommended because it contains many
advantages like not being affected by scale invariance, and is admitted to be
of help when there is no supporting document to prove the authenticity of
the ”transactions” (Varian 1972). Nowadays, this so called ”law” provides a
convenient basis for digital analysis of sequences of numbers of similar nature.
For example, an analysis based on Benford law has been used in a wide variety
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of ways to identify instances of employee theft and tax evasion (Guan et al 2008)
and also deviation of the exchange rates from regular paths (Carrera 2015) or
of the Libor rates (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2011).
In fact, following Thomas (1989), a ”manipulation expectation” can be ob-
tained using the Benford (1938) law, as was later pointed out by Nigrini (1994,
1996, 2012).
Since Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997), it is admitted that BL1 can be used to
detect fraud in accounting data reporting individual incomes. The presentation
and demonstration of the Newcomb-Benford law (1881-1938), as a powerful
methodology in the audit field, were further emphasized by Hill (1998), Pinkham
(1961), Raimi (1985), Durtschi et al. (2004), among others, and also recently
in Cleary and Thibodeau (2005), Nigrini and Miller (2012), Clippe and Ausloos
(2012), Pimbley (2014), Amiram et al. (2015), Mir (2016), Ausloos et al. (2016).
In fact, BL1 is also applied outside the financial audit realm; e.g. see Fu et al.
(2007) for image forensics, Ausloos et al. (2015) for birth rate anomalies, Pollach
et al. (2015) for maternal mortality rates, or elsewhere in the natural sciences
(Sambridge, et al. 2010), and on religious activities (Mir 2012). We notice that
the literature is huge: see Alali and Romero (2013), for approximately the last
decade, Costa et al. (2013), or Beebe (2016), which contains a rather exhaustive
list of references.
Limiting ourselves at the public government financial realm data tampering,
let us mention, among others, the application of Benford law to selected balances
in the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports of the fifty states of the United
States (Haynes 2012; Johnson and Weggenmann 2013); or the ”political econ-
omy of numbers” international macroeconomic statistics (Nye and Moul 2007).
A study on the analysis of the digit distribution of 134,281 contracts issued by
20 management units in two states, in Brazil, also found significant deviations
from Benford’s law (Costa et al. 2012); see also Gava and Vitiello (2014). Fraud
detection (and prevention methods) in the Malaysian Public Sector have been
discussed in Othman et al. (2015).
At a lower scale, - ours if it has to be recalled, using Benford’s law has
permitted to uncover deficiencies in the data reported by local governments,
like municipalities and states in several countries, or example, USA or Brazil.
The digit distributions of the financial statements of 3 municipalities, Valejo
City, Orange County and Jefferson County, have been shown to have significant
departures from that expected on the basis of BL1 (Haynes 2012),
In Italy, tax collection is a fundamental source of revenues for local govern-
ments, enabling the efficient delivery of services (Padovani and Scorsone 2011).
On the other hand, tax evasion is known to be widespread across Italy (Brosio
et al 2002, Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2005, Marino and Zizza 2011, Galbiati and
Zanella 2012, Chiarini et al. 2013).
Obviously, any financial distress of municipalities, resulting from income tax
evasion, has severe repercussions on the lives of the taxpayers and municipal
employees (Bartolini and Santolini 2012). This is annoying for the collectivity,
thus it seems important to have some better oversight of the quality of financial
statements and accountability in view of the demand (and use) of funds, say re-
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turning from the Italian government. Moreover, these concerns on data quality,
on one hand, and the admittedly poor auditing procedures being used in Italy,
on the other hand, have resurfaced vigorously following the bankruptcy of a
number of local government bodies during recent financial crisis (Padovani and
Scorsone 2011), - in fact, to be fair, more generally, across several industrialized
countries.
Within this review of specific accounting features relevant to our research,
it might be finally interesting to point to the reader a very recent and specific
(by ”chance”) italian case, i.e. the detection of anomalies in receivables and
payables in Italian universities, by Ciaponi and Mandanici (2015). This shows
that intermediary levels of financial data scales may contain intriguing features,
whence further suggesting to raise questions on the detection of manipulations,
through deviations from Benford law, as here the case of tax incomes in e.g.
regions.
Thus, we have considered the aggregated values of the income tax reports of
each of the 20 IT regions, - over a recent quinquennium: [2007-2011] for which
the data is available. As suggested by Lusk and Halperin (2014) we calibrate
our analysis with a χ2 test.
Our point of view is politico-economic unique: the accounting reliability of
the citizen contributions to the IT GDP, - even though questions are numerous.
Hopefully, within this framework, one can also (i) enlarge the knowledge of BL1
application range, (ii) contribute to a better application of BL1 in accounting,
and even (iii) indicate that one can reach socio-economico-political conclusions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is about the methodology.
Section 3 contains the description of the data. The findings are collected in
Sect. 4 and discussed in Section 5. The last section also allows us to offer
suggestions for further research lines. All the Tables collecting the results at
the regional level are reported in the Appendix.
2 Methodology
The reported research here below provides a thorough analysis essentially at
the regional level, of the value (= size) income tax distribution among Italian
cities, whence their contribution to the country GDP. Specifically, the data of
a given region is obtained by summing the data at a municipalities level, for
the municipalities belonging to the region under examination. We refer to the
Aggregated Income Tax (AIT, hereafter) of all the citizens living in each Italian
region.
However, income manipulation by citizens, if it exists, would occur at the
Tax Income level, whence the specific and complicated wording of the title of
this paper.
The numerical analysis is carried out on the basis of official data obtained
at the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), and concerns each
year of the 2007-2011 quinquennium. In 2011, there were 8092 municipalities
and 20 regions, with widely different characteristics. Notice, at once, that this
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concerns a large number of graphs and tables. One can concatenate them, but
that surely means 20 displays of BL1 plots, - one per region, each with 5 sets
of data points, one per year, as it is seen below. The first digit location was
examined using a simple home made algorithm. Actual occurrences of each data
point was compared to expected amounts.
MS Excel was used to organize the data into a useable form. The original
Excel data file listed municipalities according to the alphabetical order of their
names. This was pertinently useful within Mir et al. (2016) study. The aim
of the present study is to analyze AIT data at a mesoscale, i.e., regional, level.
So we first isolated and put the municipalities in their respective regions. We
used ”http://www.comuni-italiani.it/nomi/index.html” to find out the parent
regions of municipalities. The Excel spreadsheet included 20 columns to accom-
modate each year of data for each of the twenty regions and six columns for
the five years of analysis plus their average over the quinquennium. The first
digits were extracted by using the LEFT(text, num
−
chars) function of Excel
by entering the column number of interest at ”text” and ”1” (for first digit) at
”num
−
chars”. The frequency of each digit, 1 to 9, as first digit is obtained by
making use of COUNTIF(range, criteria) function by specifying the ”range”
of cells and the digit of interest at ”criteria”. The frequency of each digit, 1 to
9, as the first significant digit is thus determined.
Several tests can be made in order to assess the validity of BL1. The most
classical χ2 test is used as for other BL1 applications (Durtschi et al. 2004). Nev-
ertheless, within this constraint, the visualization of the data and the reported
test tables allow us to pin point regularities or anomalies: ”acceptable confor-
mity”, suggests that the balance is likely not biased and should be accepted
without further analysis; ”nonconformity” does not guarantee that problems
exist in the underlying accounts comprising the AIT or that fraud has occurred,
but results of the BL1 analysis should be used as an indicator that further in-
vestigation is needed. Indeed if the data does not conform to BL1, this signals
that the aggregated data may not be true representations; the numbers may be
influenced by operations, biased due to (our, but we did much cross checking)
error, or they may have been manipulated to deceive some financial statement
user.
From the ergodicity point of view (Palmer 1982, Lucas and Sargent 1981;
Davidson 1987, 1996, 2009; Samuelson 1969; Tsallis et al. 2003), it is of interest
to assess the data through a time average; this has been taken over the relevant
5 years for each region. A χ2 test has been made also on such averages.
3 Data
The economic data analyzed here below has been obtained by (and from) the
Research Center of the Italian MEF. Contributions have been disaggregated at
the municipal level (in IT a municipality or city is denoted as comune, - plural
comuni) to the Italian GDP, for five recent years: 2007-2011.
Let it be recalled that Italy is composed of 20 regions and more than 8000
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municipalities: the latter number has varied over time, even during the examined
quinquennium: from 8101 down to 8092, between 2007 and 2011: several (10)
cities have merged into (3) new entities, while (2) others were phagocytized.
Moreover, 7 municipalities have changed from the Marche a region to another
one (Emilia-Romagna), in 2008. The variation in the number of cities in each
concerned region has been taken into account: we have made a virtual merging
of cities (see also http : //www.comuni − italiani.it/regioni.html), in order to
compare AIT data for ”stable size” regions. Since the number of regions has
been constantly equal to 20, the regional level seems to be the most interesting
one for any data measure and discussion. The regions are listed by order of
importance, i.e. through their number of cities, in Table 2. Observe that the
to-be-expected χ2 calculated for the 2011 region municipality number content is
given for future reference, and avoiding extra columns or lines in other Tables.
In short, the AIT of the resulting cities, whence that of the regions, was lin-
early adapted, as if these cities and regional content were preexisting before the
merging or phagocytosis. The (rounded) AIT in successive years and the corre-
sponding averaged AIT of each region over the quinquennium are given in Table
3. The AIT and <AIT>, for IT are in (e+11) EUR, but for regions in (e+10)
EUR. As a complementary information, but irrelevant for the BL1 test, the num-
ber of inhabitants (Ninhab) in each region, according to the 2011 Census, is also
reported from http : //dati− censimentopopolazione.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang = en.
4 Results
Beside the (rounded) AIT in successive years and average AIT of a region over
the quinquennium AIT and <AIT>, given for the regions in (e+10) EUR) units,
and for IT in (e+11) EUR, given in Table 3, the statistical characteristics of the
AIT regional distribution for 2007-2011 is reported in Table 4, together with
the corresponding time average. The skewness and kurtosis are obviously both
positive, and the mean greater than the median (by a factor ∼ 1.75). Relevantly,
it can be observed that the minimum and maximum AIT, both have 1 as first
digit.
4.1 BL1 displays
Each BL1 data set for each (20) region is displayed on Figs. 1-20; different
symbols are used in order to distinguish the 5 years so examined. On each
figure, the frequency of the d digit is given, together with the theoretical BL1.
Moreover, the sample standard error bar, i.e. depending on the number of cities,
i.e. σ ≃ (1/
√
(Nc,r − 1)) allows to draw the estimated range of the confidence
interval defined as [BL1-, BL1+], in obvious notations. The display order has
been chosen according to the region ranking given in Table 2.
Denote the first digit as d, so that d = 1, . . . , 9. Visual observations (list in
descending order of Nc,r) point to:
7
year (*)
2007 2009 2011 2011
region Nc,r Ninhab < χ
2 >
Lombardia 1546 1546 ↓ 1544 9 704 151 6.3694
Piemonte 1206 4 363 916 5.2830
Veneto 581 4 857 210 7.7896
Campania 551 5 766 810 17.224
Calabria 409 1 959 050 4.4664
Sicilia 390 5 002 904 6.4494
Lazio 378 5 502 886 5.0288
Sardegna 377 1 639 362 24.587
Emilia-Romagna 341 341 ↑ 348 4 342 13 8.1620
Trentino- Adige Alto 339 ↓ 333 333 1 029 475 5.3782
Abruzzo 305 1 307 30 4.7372
Toscana 287 3 672 202 9.5140
Puglia 258 4 052 566 5.8868
Marche 246 246 ↓ 239 1 541 319 8.6922
Liguria 235 1 570 694 16.895
Friuli- Giulia Venezia 219 218 218 1 218 985 7.8444
Molise 136 313 660 12.657
Basilicata 131 578 036 7.5054
Umbria 92 884 268 11.317
ValledAosta 74 126 806 7.6682
Total 8101 ↓ 8094 ↓ 8092 59 433 744
Table 2: Number Nc,r of cities in 2011, and in previous years, in the
(20) IT regions; the region ranking follows the decreasing city number.
For a more complete information on IT cities, the number of inhabitants
(Ninhab) in each region, according to the 2011 Census, is also reported (*)
http : //dati− censimentopopolazione.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang = en. The
empirical χ2 of the averaged BL1 observations for each region can be read in
the last column: it is included in this Table in order to alleviate other Tables.
Also recall that the critical value of the χ2 test at a confidence level 0.05 is
χ20.05 = 15.51 for a number of ”degrees of freedom” ∂ = 8, which is that of BL1.
.
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i Nc,r in AIT <AIT>
= REGION 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 5yr
1 305 ABRUZZO 1.2871 1.2850 1.3053 1.3288 1.3613 1.3135
2 131 BASILICATA 0.4580 0.4735 0.4820 0.4834 0.4911 0.4776
3 409 CALABRIA 1.3404 1.3961 1.4411 1.4496 1.4516 1.4158
4 551 CAMPANIA 4.1890 4.2908 4.3589 4.3833 4.3863 4.3217
5 348 EM. ROMAGNA 6.2211 6.3448 6.2945 6.3665 6.3970 6.3248
6 218 FRIULI V.G. 1.6876 1.7121 1.7163 1.7214 1.7323 1.7139
7 378 LAZIO 7.1759 7.3436 7.4487 7.5532 7.6163 7.4275
8 235 LIGURIA 2.2020 2.2402 2.2829 2.2958 2.3003 2.2642
9 1544 LOMBARDIA 14.457 14.737 14.561 14.771 15.008 14.707
10 239 MARCHE 1.7710 1.8045 1.7977 1.8232 1.8567 1.8106
11 136 MOLISE 0.2736 0.2823 0.2825 0.2827 0.2865 0.2815
12 1206 PIEMONTE 5.9479 6.0326 5.9797 6.0515 6.1201 6.0264
13 258 PUGLIA 3.1445 3.2563 3.3082 3.3557 3.3947 3.2919
14 377 SARDEGNA 1.4896 1.5510 1.5789 1.5890 1.5977 1.5612
15 390 SICILIA 3.6977 3.8324 3.9066 3.9256 3.9451 3.8615
16 287 TOSCANA 4.7404 4.8175 4.8417 4.8943 4.9499 4.8487
17 333 TRENTINO A.A. 1.3967 1.4379 1.4808 1.5148 1.5360 1.4733
18 92 UMBRIA 1.0167 1.0432 1.0539 1.0624 1.0702 1.0493
19 74 V. D’AOSTA 0.1795 0.1849 0.1889 0.1911 0.1923 0.1873
20 581 VENETO 6.2346 6.3244 6.2912 6.3808 6.4845 6.3431
IT 8092 6.8910 7.0390 7.0601 7.1424 7.2178 7.0701
Table 3: Nc,r, the number of cities in each region; (rounded) AIT in succes-
sive years and average AIT of a region over the quinquennium. The AIT and
<AIT>, for IT is in (e+11) EUR, but for regions in (e+10) EUR.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 <AIT>
Min. (/e+09) 1.7950 1.8495 1.8891 1.9110 1.9230 1.8735
Maxi (/e+10) 14.457 14.737 14.561 14.771 15.008 14.707
Sum (/e+10) 69.910 70.390 70.601 71.424 72.178 70.701
Mean (/e+10) 3.4455 3.5195 3.5300 3.5712 3.6089 3.5350
Median (/e+10) 1.9865 2.0223 2.0403 2.0595 2.0785 2.0374
RMS (/e+10) 4.7793 4.8753 4.8601 4.9227 4.9831 4.8840
Std Dev (/e+10) 3.3982 3.4613 3.4274 3.4761 3.5254 3.4576
Std Error (/e+09) 7.5986 7.7397 7.6639 7.7729 7.8831 7.7314
Skewness 1.7795 1.7784 1.7406 1.7478 1.7672 1.7627
Kurtosis 3.4321 3.4359 3.2850 3.3097 3.3902 3.3708
Table 4: Summary of (rounded) statistical characteristics for AIT (in Euros)
of the IT regions (Nr = 20) in 2007-2011.
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• Lombardia: rather smooth distribution, not too far from confidence inter-
val (CI); d = 6, 7 somewhat away from CI; above BL1+.
• Piemonte: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI; d = 5, 6 some-
what away from CI, specifically above BL1+.
• Veneto: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI, even if d = 4, 5
are somewhat away from CI, on different sides of BL1. d = 9 is much
dispersed.
• Campania: very scattered, except d = 1, 2; other digits are far from CI.
• Calabria: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI; d = 6, 7 some-
what away from CI, above BL1+; the digit d = 2 is below BL1-.
• Sicilia: d = 1, 4 below BL1-; d = 7 much dispersed.
• Lazio: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI, even if d = 4, 5, 6
are somewhat away from CI (below BL1-).
• Sardegna: very very scattered, except for d = 1, 2.
• Emilia-Romagna: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI. d =
3, 4, 5 are somewhat away from CI and below BL1-. The digit d = 8 is
quite above BL1+.
• Trentino-Alto Adige: rather smooth distribution, not too far from CI, but
d = 4 somewhat away from CI (above BL1+). d = 7 is quite above BL1+,
while d = 6 somewhat below BL1-.
• Abruzzo: rather smooth distribution, but scattered away from CI; on
different sides of BL1.
• Toscana: much dispersed; d = 3, 4, 6, 7 below BL1-; d = 8, 9 quite above
BL1+.
• Puglia: much dispersed; d = 3, 6, 7 much below BL1-; the digits d = 2, 9
are quite above BL1+.
• Marche: very much dispersed; the digits d = 3, 6 are much below BL1-,
while d = 4, 5, 8, 9 are quite above BL1+.
• Liguria: very much dispersed. The digits d = 3, 6, 8 are much below BL1-,
while d = 2, 4, 6, 9 are quite above BL1+.
• Friuli-Venezia Giulia : rather smooth distribution, but rather far from CI;
d = 4, 5, 7 quite away from CI , below BL1-; d = 2, 3, 8 rather away above
BL1+.
• Molise: very much scattered from BL1. The digits d = 1, 2 are much much
below BL1-, while d = 3, 6 are much much above BL1+. Wide variation
for other digits.
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• Basilicata: much scattered from BL1. The digits d = 4, 8 are much below
BL1-, while d = 5, 6 are much above BL1+. A wide variation for all digits
is observed.
• Umbria: much scattered from BL1. The digits d = 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 are much
below BL1-, while d = 1, 2, 5 are much above BL1+. Also in this case,
wide variation for all digits
• Valle d’Aosta: much scattered from BL1. d = 4, 8 are much below BL1-,
and d = 2, 5, 7 are much above BL1+. Once again, there is wide variation
for all digits
4.2 χ2 conformity test
It has been emphasized that there are five χ2 values to be calculated for each
region, - one for each year. These 1one hundred χ2 values are found in Tables
5-7. Moreover, the resulting χ2 for the time average values of the AIT is also
given,- but recalled that it is given in Table 2 for simplifying the reading of the
Tables 5-7.
However, before examining each region BL1, it seems fair to examine whether
the distribution of the χ2 itself is anomalous, - in order to pin point (if it occurs)
some statistical anomaly arising from computations. Such a distribution of the
100 (20 regions, 5 years) χ2 is shown in Fig. 21.
The distribution is markedly positively skewed, but rather irregular, with
a set of outliers. Recall that the critical value of the χ2 at a significance level
0.05 is χ2
0.05 = 15.51 when the number of degrees of freedom is ∂ = 8 - that of
BL1. This rather highly peaked distribution with a few outliers (in particular
Sardegna and Liguria, - noticed in different fiscal years) is another hint toward
pursuing a BL1 analysis at the regional basis.
For emphasizing the regional aspects, and connecting with Table 2 last col-
umn, the distribution of the mean (average over the quinquennium) < χ2 >
for each region, is shown in Fig. 22. Three regions are markedly outliers in the
upper range: Sardegna, Campania and Liguria, for approximately < χ2 >≥ 15,
pointing to much (questionable) non-conformity with BL1. On the contrary,
2 regions have a low < χ2 > over the quinquennium, Abruzzo and Calabria,
indicating very fine agreement with BL1 (< χ2 >≤ 4).
At this stage, it seems important to point to a quite substantial time-
invariance of the χ2 values, according to the displayed data/.
Thereafter, it seems natural to discuss each region BL1 values, to notice con-
formity or not, starting from the most valid and ending with the most anoma-
lous. In so doing, one can distinguish values according to the standard risk value
for rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e. a uniform distribution, at χ2
0.05 = 15.507 for
a number of degrees of freedom ∂ = 8; for completeness, let us observe that (for
∂ = 8) the critical value of the χ2 at a significance level 0.10 is χ20.10 = 13.362.
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4.2.1 < χ2 >≤ 13.362, and yearly (ir)regularity
It is found from Table 2 that the BL1 < χ2 > has a small value in 17 re-
gions; from the lowest to the highest: Calabria (4.4664), Abruzzo (4.7372),
Lazio (5.0288), Piemonte (5.2830) Trentino-Alto Adige (5.3782), Puglia (5.8868)
Lombardia (6.3694) Sicilia (6.4494) Basilicata (7.5054), Valle d’Aosta (7.6682),
Veneto (7.7896), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (7.8444), Emilia-Romagna (8.1620), Marche
(8.6922), Toscana (9.5140), Umbria (11.317) and Molise (12.657).
Among these, Tables 5-7 show that much regularity is observed in the re-
spective yearly values, with some exceptions.
The values for Veneto (11.33) in 2007, Emilia-Romagna (10.60) in 2010,
and Valle d’Aosta (11.31) in 2010 are such that the respective χ2 fall outside
the 5% sampling error bar. The largest χ2 value for Molise occurs in 2008,
∼ 20.99, although a surprisingly quite small χ2 value ∼ 9.74 occurs in 2007.
The χ2 values for Umbria are high, but without any severe hint of an anomaly;
the distribution of χ2 values is quite narrow indeed for Umbria, implying some
systematicity.
4.2.2 < χ2 >≥ 15.507, and yearly (ir)regularity
In contrast, Liguria (16.895), Campania (17.224), and Sardegna (24.587) are the
3 regions with an indication of much lack of conformity with respect to BL1.
The two largest χ2 values for Sardegna occur in 2007 and 2011: ∼ 56.00
and 21.36, respectively. The largest χ2 values for Campania occur in 2007 and
2008: ∼ 21.65 and 23.02, respectively. The largest χ2 value for Liguria occurs
in 2008: ∼ 27.17; surprisingly, a quite small χ2 value ∼ 9.70 occurs in 2011.
5 Discussion
This section fixes and discusses the results of the investigation.
In general, the concordance between the AIT of Italian regions and the
theoretical statement of BL1 is rather questionable. There are discrepancies at
a regional level, an this is in line with the heterogeneous nature of Italian regions
under a socio-economic point of view. In particular, one can note a very good
matching between geographic and economic features of the regions, and cluster
them among N (North), C (Center), S (South, plus Sicilia and Sardegna).
N is the part of Italy constituted by 8 regions: Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Trentino-Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta
and Veneto;
C contains 5 regions: Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Toscana and Umbria;
S is the remaining 7 regions: Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia,
Sardegna, Sicilia.
Deviations from BL1 are usually read as ”data manipulation”. However, the
law is surely a subject of controversy in accounting. It is not clear even now nei-
ther why it should be valid at all, under whatever ”socio-economic conditions”,
nor whether its theoretical derivation, under various hypotheses, informs us on
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its origins and its range of applications. Even Newcomb and Benford were du-
bious of the realm of validity. Therefore, a deep exploration of the regional
reality behind the AIT data, of how they have been collected and of the shadow
economy at a regional level are required to provide a rigorous interpretation of
the results. This is well-beyond the scopes of this paper. We can only give some
suggestions and discussions, to be likely taken as arguments for future studies.
Among the 3 regions with very anomalous BL1 χ2, two belong to S: Sardegna
and Campania, while the other comes from N : Liguria.
Sardegna is characterized by a noticeable fragmentation at a city level in
several municipalities with very small number of inhabitants. This region does
not have a highly developed industrial structure, and a wide part of the regional
economy is still based on agriculture and livestock. In the small communities
the economy is somewhat closed, and business exchanges are often based on
commodities. In such a situation, one can guess that the existence of a discrep-
ancy between the official data and the income tax should come from the real
regional economy.
Sadly, Campania has the relevant problem of a massive influence of the
organized crime on the economic system. Hence, deviations from BL1 can be
viewed ”as expected”.
The economic system of Liguria seems to be affected by the pervasion of
shadow economy. Confartigianato (the Italian association of artisans and small
businesses) states that about 73% of the artisans is in competition with illegal
and shadow economies (see http : //www.confartigianatoliguria.it/node/4153).
This evidence represents a good hint for explaining why Liguria exhibits this
discrepancy with respect to BL1.
Unexpectedly, we admit so, the remaining regions are in accordance with the
BL1, with some disparities over the quinquennium as highlighted in the previ-
ous Section. From both an economic and a social point of view, some regions
are quite similar to Campania, with a remarkable presence of organized crime
(think at Calabria, Puglia and Sicilia, but also to the North with Veneto and
Lombardia). Basilicata and Molise are similar to Sardegna for what concerns
the absence of a well-established industrial structure. It is also worth mention-
ing that Basilicata is the main producer of fossil fuels in Italy (see the report in
http : //www.siteb.it/new%20siteb/documenti/RASSEGNA/67117.pdf). More-
over, shadow economy is generally widespread in the entire country.
To conclude: we demonstrate some hints for further exploring cases of viola-
tions of BL1, whence likely possible tax income manipulation through account-
ing city Aggregated Income Tax reports throughout all Italian Regions. We
admit that not every finding can be explained only based on BL1: we do not
understand why some regions do not have BL1 violators; we avoid to propose
speculative statements which might be called ”resulting from imagination”. Yet,
this further supports the point that a deeper analysis should be carried out to
investigate the nature of the fiscal data and how they are usually collected and
approved (Pentland and Carlile 1996).
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6 Conclusions
Today Benford’s law is routinely used by forensic analysts to detect error, in-
completeness and dubious manipulation of financial data. The basic premise
of the test is that the first digits in real data, in general, have a tendency to
approach the Benford distribution whereas people intending to play with the
numbers, when unaware of the law, try to place the digits uniformly. Thus any
departure from the law raises some suspicion. We have assessed the tax income
possible manipulation of citizens in Italy through accounting city aggregated in-
come tax reports from all Italian regions, with data obtained from the Research
Center of the Italian MEF.
The validity of the reported data does not seem to have attracted official
accountants. For example, something like Economia e Finanza locale Rapporto
2010 or RAPPORTO ANNUALE 2012 La situazione del Paese fall short of
discussing the data validity.
This paper provides an examination of a fiscal data set stemming from the
Italian citizens, on a regional level. Specifically, it focuses on the assessment of
potential manipulation of tax income through the adoption of the Benford law
for the first digit over the quinquennium 2007-2011.
The BL1 presents significant advantages over alternative measures of ac-
counting quality currently used in practice. For example, it does not require
time-series, cross-sectional, or forward-looking information, nor details on ”trans-
actions”.
Throughout the paper we refer to municipalities, though in practice we are
investigating the incomes of citizens, but we avoid any individual information
on whether individuals correctly report their income. This is an important
distinction to the extent that this is precisely the population set of interest.
Though we find significant variations in municipality tax incomes by regions,
much of the variation is actually attributable to differences in the characteristics
of regions
Another purpose of this paper has been to provide a proof of the BL1 concept
for using the fiscal data at a regional level in order to provide some information
on manipulation. It is shown that it is possible to document the variation in
income taxes across regions, to order them, and to observe a distribution of
anomalies, also in time. The sampling data at this aggregated level is large
enough to look in details at pertinent numbers, - without making strong econo-
metric modeling assumptions. The restriction on the demand of a large database
(at the country level) expected to provide the scale needed for the data to be suf-
ficiently granular can be relaxed. The data analysis points to different regional
realities, sometimes quite unexpectedly.
Durtschi et.al (2004) have pointed out that when interpreting results of
Benford’s law, one should be aware of a few risks: However, Benford law is most
effective for large data set, when data represents more than one distribution,
when the mean is greater than the median, and the skewness is positive. This
seems to be the case in our investigation.
Our findings demonstrate also that Benford’s law seems effective in detecting
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data bias in not too large data sets. There is (alas) no doubt that manipulation
of income reports exist in various regions and municipalities. Either a few ac-
countants are so well aware that BL1 is a test and can avoid the non-conformity
surprise, at the individual level, but cannot do so at the next (city aggregation)
level.
Thus, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to document whether income
tax aggregated data conforms to the (first) Benford’s law, i.e. how without
examining (individual) citizens financial reports are likely to exhibit divergences.
In so doing, a view of fraud or manipulation is put on a more collective level.
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Figure 1: Lombardia.
Figure 2: Piemonte.
22
Figure 3: Veneto..
Figure 4: Campania.
23
Figure 5: Calabria.
Figure 6: Sicilia.
24
Figure 7: Lazio.
Figure 8: Sardegna.
25
Figure 9: Emilia-Romagna.
Figure 10: Trento-Alto Adige.
26
Figure 11: Abruzzo.
Figure 12: Toscana.
27
Figure 13: Puglia.
Figure 14: Marche.
28
Figure 15: Liguria.
Figure 16: Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
29
Figure 17: Molise.
Figure 18: Basilicata.
30
Figure 19: Umbria.
Figure 20: Valle d’Aosta.
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Figure 21: Distribution of yearly χ2 values in BL1 analysis of AIT in the 20 IT
regions.
Figure 22: Distribution of the mean (average over the quinquennium) χ2 values
in BL1 analysis of AIT in the 20 IT regions.
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Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 χ2
Year Lombardia, Nc = 1546 for 2007-2019 ; Nc = 1544 for 2010-2011
2007 0.298 0.168 0.118 0.092 0.087 0.074 0.064 0.050 0.048 5.297
2008 0.297 0.175 0.115 0.089 0.085 0.073 0.070 0.045 0.051 9.692
2009 0.299 0.176 0.114 0.093 0.085 0.072 0.070 0.048 0.043 7.348
2010 0.296 0.172 0.119 0.096 0.082 0.071 0.069 0.054 0.043 4.674
2011 0.300 0.172 0.117 0.097 0.078 0.074 0.067 0.051 0.043 4.836
Piemonte, Nc = 1206
2007 0.304 0.185 0.119 0.091 0.088 0.061 0.064 0.052 0.036 6.279
2008 0.300 0.186 0.112 0.096 0.085 0.065 0.065 0.044 0.047 5.175
2009 0.303 0.180 0.110 0.095 0.090 0.061 0.061 0.053 0.046 4.925
2010 0.304 0.185 0.111 0.094 0.086 0.070 0.055 0.054 0.041 4.327
2011 0.299 0.186 0.114 0.095 0.076 0.080 0.056 0.051 0.042 5.709
Veneto, Nc = 581
2007 0.310 0.165 0.136 0.117 0.057 0.057 0.062 0.040 0.057 11.327
2008 0.313 0.167 0.139 0.107 0.062 0.062 0.065 0.041 0.043 6.251
2009 0.320 0.170 0.138 0.105 0.062 0.064 0.062 0.043 0.036 6.309
2010 0.325 0.172 0.138 0.103 0.067 0.062 0.055 0.053 0.024 9.569
2011 0.322 0.170 0.134 0.105 0.071 0.057 0.060 0.048 0.033 5.492
Campania, Nc = 551
2007 0.309 0.160 0.096 0.094 0.067 0.102 0.051 0.054 0.067 21.647
2008 0.314 0.160 0.093 0.100 0.065 0.100 0.044 0.062 0.064 23.021
2009 0.310 0.176 0.091 0.091 0.071 0.093 0.051 0.060 0.058 14.559
2010 0.310 0.172 0.091 0.087 0.082 0.087 0.049 0.065 0.056 13.556
2011 0.310 0.172 0.087 0.083 0.087 0.078 0.060 0.058 0.064 13.336
Calabria, Nc = 409
2007 0.298 0.152 0.132 0.098 0.073 0.073 0.068 0.046 0.059 4.439
2008 0.301 0.164 0.127 0.093 0.073 0.068 0.073 0.042 0.059 4.514
2009 0.298 0.164 0.120 0.100 0.064 0.076 0.071 0.049 0.059 4.939
2010 0.308 0.166 0.115 0.103 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.051 0.042 5.420
2011 0.301 0.166 0.117 0.095 0.073 0.086 0.064 0.054 0.044 3.020
Sicilia, Nc = 390
2007 0.287 0.195 0.123 0.077 0.085 0.079 0.051 0.049 0.054 4.614
2008 0.272 0.205 0.123 0.077 0.082 0.069 0.067 0.044 0.062 7.728
2009 0.279 0.203 0.123 0.077 0.079 0.072 0.064 0.051 0.051 4.421
2010 0.282 0.197 0.131 0.074 0.085 0.056 0.079 0.038 0.056 9.723
2011 0.290 0.195 0.126 0.079 0.077 0.067 0.069 0.038 0.059 5.761
Lazio, Nc = 378
2007 0.304 0.193 0.119 0.095 0.061 0.058 0.053 0.056 0.061 4.980
2008 0.310 0.188 0.127 0.093 0.069 0.050 0.066 0.042 0.056 4.360
2009 0.315 0.193 0.116 0.087 0.082 0.048 0.061 0.040 0.058 5.894
2010 0.320 0.190 0.119 0.093 0.077 0.053 0.056 0.034 0.058 5.613
2011 0.312 0.198 0.127 0.079 0.077 0.061 0.045 0.048 0.053 4.297
Table 5: Frequencies of the first digit in reported AIT data for IT regions with a
high Nc number, for various years; it can be visually compared to the expected
frequency according to BL given in Table 1; the corresponding calculated χ2
is to be compared with the theoretical one (15.507) for a number of degree of
freedom (∂ = 8) at 0.05%. The null hypothesis is not verified for underlined
cases. 33
Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 χ2
Year Sardegna, Nc = 337
2007 0.310 0.167 0.093 0.053 0.050 0.119 0.064 0.109 0.034 56.001
2008 0.310 0.172 0.095 0.106 0.069 0.093 0.077 0.024 0.053 15.606
2009 0.316 0.175 0.101 0.095 0.085 0.069 0.093 0.032 0.034 13.908
2010 0.318 0.175 0.095 0.090 0.093 0.061 0.095 0.034 0.037 16.059
2011 0.314 0.174 0.103 0.087 0.092 0.066 0.103 0.029 0.032 21.363
Emilia-Romagna, Nc = 348
2007 0.296 0.201 0.103 0.078 0.069 0.069 0.057 0.066 0.060 7.516
2008 0.310 0.204 0.101 0.080 0.066 0.066 0.060 0.063 0.049 6.121
2009 0.305 0.201 0.103 0.072 0.075 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.063 8.040
2010 0.290 0.201 0.112 0.072 0.072 0.055 0.066 0.063 0.069 10.604
2011 0.299 0.195 0.115 0.072 0.060 0.069 0.063 0.072 0.055 8.529
Trentino-Alto Adige, Nc = 339
2007 0.322 0.159 0.127 0.100 0.077 0.065 0.062 0.062 0.027 4.713
2008 0.300 0.168 0.126 0.099 0.081 0.048 0.075 0.060 0.042 4.225
2009 0.285 0.171 0.135 0.105 0.078 0.048 0.084 0.039 0.054 7.975
2010 0.300 0.168 0.120 0.114 0.078 0.057 0.072 0.048 0.042 2.992
2011 0.294 0.156 0.117 0.120 0.087 0.048 0.072 0.048 0.057 6.986
Abruzzo, Nc = 305
2007 0.292 0.187 0.105 0.085 0.089 0.056 0.075 0.052 0.059 5.381
2008 0.295 0.170 0.111 0.089 0.098 0.059 0.062 0.056 0.059 3.852
2009 0.289 0.164 0.111 0.102 0.079 0.062 0.066 0.056 0.072 6.090
2010 0.298 0.154 0.121 0.092 0.085 0.069 0.066 0.052 0.062 3.252
2011 0.318 0.144 0.115 0.095 0.079 0.062 0.079 0.059 0.049 5.111
Toscana, Nc = 287
2007 0.331 0.188 0.125 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.035 0.059 0.066 11.580
2008 0.328 0.195 0.105 0.080 0.070 0.059 0.042 0.059 0.063 7.097
2009 0.321 0.206 0.094 0.084 0.073 0.056 0.038 0.066 0.063 10.148
2010 0.341 0.195 0.101 0.084 0.066 0.059 0.042 0.045 0.066 8.958
2011 0.369 0.185 0.101 0.091 0.073 0.042 0.056 0.038 0.045 9.787
Puglia, Nc = 258
2007 0.306 0.194 0.116 0.089 0.089 0.043 0.054 0.047 0.062 5.060
2008 0.295 0.213 0.101 0.101 0.074 0.078 0.039 0.047 0.054 5.989
2009 0.291 0.217 0.101 0.097 0.074 0.078 0.035 0.062 0.047 7.260
2010 0.302 0.209 0.105 0.101 0.078 0.074 0.031 0.062 0.039 6.800
2011 0.310 0.202 0.112 0.101 0.070 0.074 0.035 0.054 0.043 4.325
Table 6: Frequencies of the first digit in reported AIT data for IT regions with
a medium range Nc number, for various years; it can be visually compared to
the expected frequency according to BL given in Table 1; the corresponding
calculated χ2 is to be compared with the theoretical one (15.507) for a number
of degree of freedom (∂ = 8) at 0.05%. The null hypothesis is always verified in
these cases.
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Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 χ2
Year Marche, Nc = 239
2007 0.268 0.172 0.092 0.121 0.084 0.063 0.054 0.071 0.075 11.051
2008 0.285 0.172 0.092 0.113 0.084 0.071 0.059 0.054 0.071 6.486
2009 0.280 0.180 0.088 0.117 0.088 0.071 0.067 0.042 0.067 7.370
2010 0.285 0.180 0.096 0.096 0.109 0.054 0.071 0.038 0.071 9.946
2011 0.293 0.197 0.088 0.096 0.105 0.042 0.071 0.054 0.054 8.608
Liguria, Nc = 235
2007 0.272 0.209 0.085 0.089 0.077 0.098 0.043 0.047 0.081 15.920
2008 0.268 0.213 0.089 0.081 0.055 0.111 0.055 0.034 0.094 27.173
2009 0.294 0.209 0.077 0.098 0.060 0.094 0.060 0.034 0.077 15.719
2010 0.289 0.196 0.094 0.102 0.047 0.094 0.072 0.030 0.077 15.954
2011 0.306 0.191 0.089 0.115 0.047 0.089 0.060 0.043 0.060 9.707
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Nc = 219 for 2007 ; Nc = 218 for 2008-2011
2007 0.279 0.210 0.142 0.078 0.055 0.059 0.068 0.064 0.046 6.075
2008 0.289 0.220 0.138 0.078 0.046 0.073 0.055 0.064 0.037 7.940
2009 0.280 0.220 0.142 0.078 0.041 0.069 0.064 0.064 0.041 8.993
2010 0.303 0.206 0.142 0.073 0.050 0.073 0.060 0.060 0.032 6.516
2011 0.284 0.211 0.151 0.069 0.055 0.073 0.041 0.073 0.041 9.698
Molise, Nc = 136
2007 0.243 0.125 0.191 0.118 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.051 0.051 9.741
2008 0.221 0.110 0.213 0.118 0.059 0.103 0.044 0.074 0.059 20.990
2009 0.250 0.110 0.184 0.110 0.081 0.103 0.051 0.066 0.044 11.890
2010 0.228 0.132 0.169 0.118 0.096 0.081 0.066 0.037 0.074 10.475
2011 0.235 0.140 0.169 0.096 0.103 0.081 0.081 0.029 0.066 10.190
Basilicata, Nc = 131
2007 0.290 0.160 0.130 0.061 0.122 0.076 0.061 0.023 0.076 9.965
2008 0.282 0.168 0.107 0.107 0.084 0.092 0.031 0.061 0.069 5.365
2009 0.290 0.160 0.122 0.099 0.061 0.099 0.053 0.053 0.061 3.567
2010 0.290 0.168 0.115 0.092 0.076 0.122 0.023 0.053 0.061 9.692
2011 0.305 0.160 0.099 0.115 0.053 0.122 0.046 0.046 0.053 8.938
Umbria, Nc = 92
2007 0.380 0.207 0.130 0.065 0.109 0.054 0.011 0.022 0.022 10.855
2008 0.370 0.207 0.130 0.065 0.120 0.043 0.022 0.022 0.022 10.348
2009 0.370 0.207 0.130 0.076 0.120 0.043 0.022 0.022 0.011 11.093
2010 0.370 0.217 0.120 0.076 0.109 0.065 0.011 0.000 0.033 12.352
2011 0.380 0.217 0.109 0.087 0.109 0.054 0.011 0.011 0.022 11.938
Valle d’Aosta, Nc = 74
2007 0.270 0.230 0.095 0.081 0.122 0.054 0.081 0.041 0.027 5.456
2008 0.270 0.243 0.108 0.068 0.108 0.054 0.081 0.014 0.054 6.760
2009 0.284 0.203 0.122 0.054 0.149 0.054 0.068 0.027 0.041 7.477
2010 0.284 0.216 0.108 0.027 0.162 0.068 0.054 0.041 0.041 11.309
2011 0.284 0.176 0.135 0.041 0.135 0.081 0.054 0.027 0.068 7.339
Table 7: Frequencies of the first digit in reported AIT data for IT regions with
a low Nc number, for various years; it can be visually compared to the expected
frequency according to BL given in Table 1; the corresponding calculated χ2
is to be compared with the theoretical one (15.507) for a number of degree of
freedom (∂ = 8) at 0.05%. The null hypothesis is not verified for underlined
cases. 35



